economist

When Russia invaded Ukraine it jolted the democracies of East Asia—Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, all allies of America. A trip to Japan suggests to Banyan that, as the conflict in Ukraine enters its third year, its implications for East Asian policymakers grow only starker. In Europe the talk is of whether Ukraine can hold on despite dwindling American financial support and the spectre of a second Trump presidency. The consequences for peace in Asia would be devastating if Ukraine loses. A win for President Vladimir Putin might embolden China to reshape the regional order on its terms.

The implications are greatest for Taiwan. China wants to absorb it, by force if necessary. To Taiwanese the parallels between what Mr Putin is doing to Ukraine and what China’s Xi Jinping might do to Taiwan are stark—especially as the two men claim a friendship with “no limits”. China has been upping the military tempo with incursions into Taiwan’s air and sea space. In response, in August the Taiwanese government unveiled a record defence budget, equivalent to 2.6% of gdp—not enough to deter China, yet bigger proportionally than most of Europe.

The incoming president, William Lai Ching-te, promises to increase spending further. Joseph Wu, the outgoing foreign minister, makes clear that American support for Ukraine is critical for Asia, signalling that America will also support Taiwan. This steely sense of realism is found elsewhere. After the Ukraine invasion, Kishida Fumio, Japan’s prime minister, jettisoned a policy of rapprochement towards Russia and embraced Western sanctions. Japan plans to almost double defence spending over five years. Despite being formally pacifist it is closer than ever to being committed to help America defend Taiwan. Military ties have been growing among America, South Korea and Japan. South Korea’s president Yoon Suk-yeol has been coy about shipping munitions to Ukraine, in part so as not to drive Russia and North Korea closer. But with North Korea now sending artillery shells to Russia, some in Seoul argue for a firmer pro-Ukraine stance.

One threat is that Congress fails to fund Ukraine, and that Europe fails to make up the difference. That could lead to a Ukrainian defeat, undermining the credibility of American deterrence in Asia. The other scenario involves Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s all-but-inevitable presidential candidate, who has repudiated America’s guarantees to nato. He admires Mr Putin, dislikes Ukraine and cares little for Taiwan. The Japanese portmanteau phrase moshi Tora—if Trump [returns, then what?]—is the key question.